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Abstract 
Art galleries and museums have often been considered as sites at which the international and the political 
are both enacted and reworked. But how exactly does art ‘do’ geopolitics? Taking existing work on art and 
geopolitics in the gallery and museum as its departure point, this article advances a specific conceptual 
argument for how art does geopolitics that connects thinking in this area with broader debates in aesthetics 
and politics. Building on Jacques Rancière’s account of art as a dispositif, it explores the aesthetic politics – 
or metapolitics – through which artistic interventions have raised questions of oil within the Tate Galleries 
in London. Drawing out its ambiguities as well as potential critical implications, the article illustrates 
distinct ways in which the metapolitics of art may be activated via a discussion of The Robinson Institute, 
2012, and of a series of interventions conducted since 2010 by the group Liberate Tate. In conclusion, the 
article draws out connections between the metapolitics of art and questions of governmentality. 	
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Introduction 
The outlines of military drones are marked out by white lines in major cities around the 
world. Photographs showing the faint traces of satellites that do not officially exist are 
made public. Someone walks along the Green Line in Israel-Palestine, dripping a line of 
paint from a can. An allusive documentary film traces diplomatic, corporate and 
intelligence interests involved in the extraction and transportation of oil out of the 
Caspian. A model ship, with sails made from patterned fabrics symbolising African 
identity and independence, is placed in a bottle and exhibited on a plinth in London’s 
Trafalgar Square. An Iraqi man living in the United States affixes a small camera to the 
back of his head, so that it will take a photo of what is directly behind him, every minute, 
for a year, as he pursues his career and travels internationally. A collection of paintings, 
photographs and maps tracing the networks that bring oil to Britain and distribute it 
around the country is assembled and displayed in a prestigious building in central 
London. A group of people clad in black bring a block of ice from the Arctic and deposit 
it at the heart of an institution that is sponsored by an oil company.1 
As some of these examples illustrate, artistic practices, works and events are by 
no means confined to gallery and museum spaces, but the ways in which art might be 
said to enact geopolitics become particularly visible in and around them. Indeed, as work 
in political science and international relations has considered, the museum and the gallery 
are sites in which the international and the political are continually being both enacted 
and reworked.2 
As political geographers have come to consider how art works and art exhibitions 
have addressed contemporary geopolitics, the Tate Galleries in London have emerged as 
sites of particular interest. Recent work has considered Mark Wallinger’s 2007 work State 
Britain, which recreated an anti-war demonstration that had been largely cleared from 
Parliament Square within the prestigious Duveen Galleries at Tate Britain and Fiona 
	 4 
Banner’s 2010 work Harrier and Jaguar, which installed two decommissioned military 
planes within, again, the Duveen Galleries.3 In both discussions, the ways in which the 
art works might be said to have interrupted and disrupted their surrounding spaces are 
identified as being central to their aesthetic and thus political significance.4  
In this article I consider further the enactment and reworking of geopolitics 
within galleries and museums and at the Tate Galleries in London in particular, 
advancing a specific argument as to how art enacts geopolitics at such sites. In so doing, 
I suggest a conceptual narrative that both complements the recent literature on art in 
relation to geopolitics and reframes it in terms of broader questions of aesthetics and 
politics. 
In much recent work on art in relation to geopolitics, the focus of interest has 
been on the manner in which art questions or resists particular dispositifs of geopolitical 
power; of, for example, border security, airpower, military urbanism or late modern war.5 
At the same time, however, within this work, what Jacques Rancière refers to as the 
dispositif of art has tended to be under-conceptualised, with the result that the supposed 
power and critical efficacy of art is sometimes invoked more than explicated.6 When art’s 
supposed power and efficacy is explicated at a conceptual level, meanwhile, analysis has 
tended to overlook the ambiguities of aesthetic politics. To consider more fully how art 
‘does’ geopolitics, I suggest, it is useful to conceptualise art in terms of the dispositif 
through which its conditions of possibility are constituted and to which at least some of 
its ambiguities may be traced. Despite the continuing diversification of the sites and 
forms of artistic practice, galleries and museums remain central to the materialisation of 
this dispositif. 
In focusing on these sites, I also provide further consideration of how different 
kinds of practices and controversies surrounding oil subtend contemporary geopolitics.7 
As I discuss, these practices and controversies bear not just upon the invasion and 
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occupation of Iraq or the politics of security (addressed in State Britain), or military air 
power (addressed in Harrier and Jaguar), but on the use of oil in art and on the political 
economy of the arts themselves. What I try to show is how such controversies and 
practices have been played out metapolitically in museum and gallery space. My use of the 
term metapolitics here draws on Rancière’s discussion of aesthetics as a specific kind of 
politics that may reflect, shadow or intertwine with ‘politics proper’, without being 
reducible to it.8 Rancière’s idea of metapolitics has been cited in work on, for example, 
the politics of Cold War culture,9 but is particularly useful to develop in the present 
context because it points towards precisely those issues that have tended to remain 
under-conceptualised in political geography. 
The article proceeds in three stages. First, I review the concept of the dispositif 
and consider its centrality to recent work in geopolitics. Second, drawing particularly on 
Rancière, I discuss the dispositif of art and its metapolitics. I then explore and exemplify 
the argument by considering two sets of interventions at Tate Britain and Tate Modern 
that have dealt with questions of oil, but which have sought to activate the metapolitics 
of art in distinct ways. In conclusion, I consider the broader implications of the analysis 
and how it might inform further research. 
 
 
Geopolitics through the disposi t i f  
A growing body of research approaches questions of geopolitics in terms of the dispositif, 
a concept introduced by Michael Foucault that denotes a ‘thoroughly heterogeneous 
ensemble’ of elements that assumes a ‘strategic function’ in the exercise of power.10 In 
taking as their object of investigation formations such as border control, risk, military 
urbanism, global health security, aerial bombing, the politics of walls and fences, logistics, 
urban resilience, drug control and ethical killing, a wide range of studies have either 
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invoked or evoked this idea.11 In each case, a particular formation of geopolitical power 
is understood in terms of a constellation of rationalities, technologies, knowledges and 
tactics that coalesces around specific problems of government. If, as Giorgio Agamben 
suggests, the word dispositif  ‘is a decisive technical term in the strategy of Foucault’s 
thought’, then it has also become central to critical research in geopolitics.12 
In summarising the role played by the concept of the dispositif in his research, 
Foucault outlined three things in particular. First, a dispositif is made up of diverse 
elements: ‘discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, 
administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic 
propositions – in short, the said as much as the unsaid’. Second, a dispositif emerges as 
such because of ‘the system of relations that can be established between these elements’. 
Third, a dispositif gains coherence in terms of how it acquires a dominant strategic 
function in response to ‘urgent needs’ at ‘particular historical moments’. A given dispositif 
is further ‘always inscribed in a play of power, but it is also always linked to certain 
coordinates of knowledge’.13 Introduced via his research on sexuality, Foucault also 
discussed sovereignty, discipline and security, as well as police and military-diplomatic 
formations in these terms.14 
The English language publication of the 1977-1978 lecture course Security, 
Territory, Population (STP) in 2007 has further enhanced the influence of Foucault’s 
thought among scholars of geopolitics and related fields. Though his thinking on 
governmentality, biopower and security could to some extent be grasped through course 
summaries, interviews, short pieces of writing and individual lectures, as well as in other 
key books, the publication of STP has allowed a much fuller understanding of Foucault’s 
work on these concepts and thus his analysis of modern forms of power. Key points of 
departure have been Foucault’s discussions of the aleatory, events and crises of 
circulation; of risk and the use of economic means of government; of the milieu and the 
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population as objects and products of security; of the circulation of security practices 
between colonial and metropolitan spaces. His positing of police and military-diplomatic 
technologies as constitutive of the modern state and states system has also been highly 
influential. STP has subsequently become a key reference point for work on a wide range 
of topics related to geopolitics and security, particularly though not exclusively in light of 
the post-2001 US-led war on terror and the dramatic expansion of the security field. 
This amounts to a significant reconceptualisation of geopolitics along 
Foucauldian lines in terms of rationalities and practices, techniques and technologies, in 
which the concept of the dispositif plays a central role, whether explicitly or implicitly. 
Some of this work has further been informed by reflections upon and iterations of 
Foucault’s work by Agamben and by Gilles Deleuze, who have inflected the concept 
with their own particular concerns. 15 Notably, while Foucault’s dispositif exercises a 
‘dominant strategic function’, liable to ‘functional overdetermination’ and ‘strategic 
elaboration’, the Deleuzian dispositif is 
a tangle, a multilinear ensemble… And the lines in the apparatus do not outline or surround 
systems which are homogenous in their own right, object, subject, language and so on, but follow 
directions, trace balances which are always off balance, now drawing together and then distancing 
themselves from one another. Each line is broken and subject to changes in direction, bifurcating 
and forked, and subject to drifting.16 
Whereas Agamben stresses the propensity of the dispositif ‘to capture, orient, determine, 
intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, behaviours, opinions or discourses of 
living beings’, Deleuze emphasises the possibility of things becoming otherwise.17 As 
Stephen Legg summarises, ‘What we have in these two discussions is, then, an 
acknowledgement that apparatuses are etymologically and genealogically indissociable 
from regulation and government, but that their very multiplicity necessarily opens spaces 
of misunderstanding, resistance and flight’.18 Dispositifs play an ordering role in orienting 
subjectivation and conduct, but to privilege their effectiveness in capturing and 
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containing lively beings (as does Agamben) is a questionable analytical choice in that it 
also obscures the extent to which dispositifs are enabling as well as constraining, 
productive as well as repressive, though in different manner and measure depending 
how, where and in relation to whom they operate. 
A further dimension of the dispositif in Foucault’s thought relates to how it 
implicates questions of materiality. Dispositifs are made up of ‘discourses, institutions, 
architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific 
statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions – in short, the said as 
much as the unsaid’. Dispositifs are therefore understood as being entangled in the 
materiality of things, whether epidemics, famines, factories, prisons, clinics, towns, 
bodies or populations, in complex ways that are constituted but not fully determined by 
human action or by power. This point is further emphasised when considering the 
evental character of the dispositif: it is around particular, urgent, events – especially crises 
of circulation (but potentially anything which exposes life to aleatory or chance events) 
that dispositifs form and shift. 19 
Such events may be understood as moments of threat or danger, but it is also 
with them that the future is particularly open to change and intervention. Events are thus 
crucial openings for the ‘critical ontology of ourselves’, outlined by Foucault in his essay 
What is Enlightenment? Here he argues that critical ontology ‘must be considered not, 
certainly, as a theory, a doctrine, or even a permanent body of knowledge’, but ‘an 
attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and 
the same time the historical analysis of the limits imposed upon us and an experiment 
with the possibility of going beyond them’.20 In this context, an experiment may be 
thought of as an exploratory intervention in the configuration and functioning of a 
particular dispositif of power. But just as the dispositif is not purely repressive, so must it be 
recognised that experimentation is by no means inherently or necessarily progressive; 
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rather it is part of the ontology and practice of power itself: to exercise geopolitical 
power through a dispositif is necessarily to experiment with its composition and 
configuration. 
Insights along these lines are evident in a number of English-language 
investigations by Euro-American scholars of how formations of geopolitical power are 
engaged via artistic practices.21 As Amoore and Hall argue in relation to borders and 
security, art enacts interruptions of the routines through which borders are performed, 
providing moments of enchantment or critical awareness. As Anne-Laure Amilhat Szary 
similarly argues, art works can intervene performatively in the production of border 
spaces. Alison Williams highlights how artworks can disrupt the geopolitical discourses 
of airpower through performative, material interventions, while Derek Gregory discusses 
how art can complicate and re-populate the reductive and abstract visualities that enable 
war. For Stephen Graham, art is one of a number of critical practices that can resist and 
experiment with the techniques of military urbanism. Andrew Barry’s work, meanwhile, 
considers how ethical performances are staged in relation to the oil industry through 
hybrid artistic-research-activist practices. But while a number of theories about what art 
does and how it does it have been deployed in this literature, the prior ontological and 
epistemological questions of what art is and how we come to recognise it as such are 
often overlooked. To turn things around, it is possible to ask, what kind of a dispositif is 
art that it can enable geopolitics to be engaged in such ways?  
 
Metapolitics of art 
The idea of art that has tended to be highlighted in recent writings on geopolitics came 
into being in Western European societies during the eighteenth century, in the context of 
bourgeois revolutions, nationalist movements and colonial projects and an associated, 
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dramatic, expansion of means for the shaping of environments and the training, control 
and management of human bodies and populations. 
It was during this period that the term aesthetics was coined to denote a concern 
with beauty and with the fine arts as a sphere of experience and practice distinct from the 
instrumental and practical concerns of science, economy or politics. It therefore also 
came to be associated with ideas of proper conduct, appropriate forms of sensibility and 
matters of judgement.22 Along with the creation of schools of art and of public as well as 
private museums and galleries, into which were gathered a wide variety objects from 
metropoles, provinces and colonies, art and aesthetics thus came to play an important 
role in the configuration of the public sphere. In helping to organise space, knowledge 
and visibility and to specify appropriate and desirable forms of subjectification and 
conduct, they are implicated in the emergence of modern Western forms of 
governmentality. 
Here I want to consider Rancière’s argument that art in the singular is a dispositif 
that generates a particular kind of metapolitics. As he states, ‘there is no art without a 
specific form of visibility and discursivity which identifies it as such’.23 And as he 
expresses this elsewhere, in a statement that is pertinent to the existing literature on art 
and geopolitics, ‘the project of politicizing art – for instance in the form of a critical art – 
is always anticipated by the forms of politicity entailed in the forms of visibility and 
intelligibility that make art identifiable as such’.24 In other words, in order to work out 
what makes art political, we first have to consider what makes it art. We must enquire 
into its conditions of possibility and relate it to the heterogeneous ensemble of elements 
and the problems of government through which it emerges as such. This leads us 
towards metapolitics. 
The conditions of possibility for the identification of art as such are for Rancière 
threefold: first, there is a breakdown in the hierarchy of the arts, in which ‘the artistic’ 
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can no longer be defined by listing a series of ‘fine’ art practices (music, sculpture, 
painting...) in distinction to practical or applied arts. Second, neither can art be 
definitively isolated from social and political life more generally: the practices and objects 
of everyday life appear in art and those of art appear in everyday life with increasing 
regularity. Third, this ‘aesthetic’ dispositif of art starts to displace the effectivity of the 
ethical and the representational dispositifs that preceded it: art is no longer understood to 
teach lessons about good conduct or to mirror proper social hierarchies and relations. In 
becoming disembedded from pre-existing accounts of ethics or social order, art can be 
about anything and for anyone and it can begin to evoke modern forms of autonomy, 
freedom and subjectivity in all their ambiguity. In this way, art acquires a distinct 
metapolitics that derives principally from art’s complex spatio-temporal, affective and 
experiential relation to ordinary life. 
The dispositif of art is materialised through a heterogeneous ensemble of elements 
– schools, museums, galleries, exhibitions, performances, prizes, sales, works, 
philosophies of art – that allow things to be made, identified and experienced as art. The 
dispositif of art is composed of things and objects; practices and processes, sites and 
spaces; noise as well as speech; walls, floors, frames and screens; ‘material and symbolic 
space’.25 Its metapolitics emerges from the ways in which it configures affect and 
sensation, shock and strangeness; but also common sense and sense-making. Rather than 
targeting affect directly, the metapolitics of art emerges via a specific sensory experience 
in which relations between affect and practice, emotion and cognition, imagination and 
reason, sensation and intention, are set in play, reconfiguring time, space and experience 
in ways that are precluded in ordinary life. 
The metapolitics of art thus lie in how its ‘‘ways of doing and making’ … 
intervene in the general distribution of ways of doing and making as well as in the 
relationships they maintain to modes of being and forms of visibility’.26 As Deleuze’s 
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rendering of the dispositif would suggest, these ways of doing and making and their 
relationships to modes of being, forms of visibility and practices of sense-making, are 
always in motion, shifting, drifting and bifurcating across the diverse innovations and 
experiments of art movements as they wrestle with how sensibility and common sense, 
experience and practice, can be configured in any given historical moment. The 
distinctiveness of the dispositif of art is that it constitutes ‘a specific sensorium that stands 
out as an exception from the normal regime of the sensible’, while, paradoxically, in 
many respects (for example in the case of ‘ready-made’ art or in the appropriation of art 
forms by advertising) becoming indistinguishable from it.27 Conceived in this way, the 
metapolitics of art are inherently and necessarily ambiguous. 
So what happens when geopolitics appears in this dispositif of art? For Rancière, if 
art has a politics, it resides not in explicitly political content or messages, but in the 
metapolitics (or ‘primary aesthetics’)28 of the dispositif. This lies in the interplay and 
tension between two tendencies that inhere in art’s condition as a distinct sensorium: 
withdrawal from life into an autonomous condition (as in art for art’s sake) and moving 
the other way and becoming life itself (as in anti-aesthetic and anti-art movements).29 In 
the aesthetic dispositif, art can be both ‘autonomous’ from life and ‘heteronomous’ with it, 
outside and inside, at the same time. The aesthetic dispositif also promises radical equality: 
art can be anything, for anyone, but at the same time, ‘no direct cause-effect relationship 
is determinable between the intention realized in an art performance and a capacity for 
political subjectification’.30 This is particularly so in the case of art that aspires to some 
critical or political role:  
From the zones of indistinction between art and life [critical or political art] … must borrow the 
connections that provoke political intelligibility. And from the separateness of artworks it must 
borrow the sense of sensory foreignness that enhances political energies. Political art must be some 
sort of collage of these opposites.31 
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In this argument, therefore, the political potential and limit of art derive less from 
its content than from the metapolitics of its artness. Furthermore, so long as we remain 
within this dispositif, in which ‘art’ is understood to constitute a distinct sensorium, art 
that attempts to become life (for example through direct political action) runs the risk of 
dissolving into the background, losing its charge or, conversely, becoming a ‘parody of its 
alleged efficacy’.32 Conversely, art that strives to protect an arena of freedom through 
autonomy from politics risks losing its connection to any kind of politics at all. If it is to 
be effective, political or critical art must maintain a degree of ambiguity between 
heteronomy and autonomy. 
A key aspect of this metapolitics lies in the interaction between the ‘unreadable’ 
affect or sensation a work might engender and its ‘readable’ political sense. Indeed, 
Rancière suggests that ‘the dream of a suitable work of political art’ lies in engendering 
political effect ‘without having to use the terms of a message as a vehicle’.33 The fact that 
this is termed a ‘dream’ expresses Rancière’s skepticism about whether affect and effect 
can actually be aligned in this way within the aesthetic dispositif, a skepticism expressed in 
his critiques of politically-engaged art works made during the 1990s.34 Art’s metapolitics 
are fragile and prone to break down. One intriguing question is therefore whether more 
recent experiments in art – especially those emerging in relation to geopolitical events 
since 2001 – have been able to realise this dream any more effectively. 
These dynamics are, it is worth emphasising, necessarily spatial: if art is 
metapolitical, it is ‘because of the type of space and time that it institutes, and the manner 
in which it frames this time and peoples this space’.35 In other words, 
there exists a politics of aesthetics that predates artistic intentions and strategies: the theatre, the 
museum and the book are ‘aesthetic’ realities in and of themselves… they are specific distributions 
of space and time, of the visible and invisible, that create specific forms of ‘commonsense’, 
regardless of the specific message such-and-such an artist intends to convey and or cause he or she 
wants to serve’.36 
	 14 
Although Rancière writes that the politics of art ‘is not a simple matter of an 
‘institution’’,37 the functioning of a dispositif can only be understood from the inter-related 
functioning of its elements, in which the manner of operation of specific institutions, in 
specific places at specific times, matters. And while the aesthetic regime of art promises 
equality and freedom, the art world remains highly regulated, with the funding, 
production, circulation, exhibition, exchange, appraisal and public reception of art 
mediated through art schools, public and private galleries and museums, auction houses, 
as well as academic disciplines, debates and schemes of critical evaluation. These in turn 
embody forms of cultural capital and social networks that are highly selective and which 
to a significant extent reflect broader forms of inequality and exclusion. However, 
Rancière’s influence within English-language art circles since 2000 – and his critiques of 
particular art works and movements notwithstanding – is down in no small measure to 
the extent to which he still holds out a potential political role for it. No matter how 
commodified, no matter how co-opted by oligarchic elites or vested interests, no matter 
how inscribed in the play of power, his work suggests, if art as such exists, its 
metapolitics remain open for those who would experiment with them. 
Rancière’s thinking on aesthetics, politics and art can be taken as broadly 
genealogical. Yet while the political contexts, rationalities and tactics of art movements 
have indeed varied widely, he has nevertheless argued that the ‘models of efficacy’ that 
‘govern our strategies, hopes and judgements regarding the political import of artistic 
practice’ can indeed be traced to late eighteenth-century Europe, to the emergence of art 
in the singular and to its openness to all kinds of practices and forms.38 And though they 
undergo wide variation, these models and their conditions of possibility are, it would 
seem, still evident in the functioning of contemporary art galleries and museums. Because 
of the ways in which they are both regulated (in that they are inscribed with and within 
other dimensions of political, economic, social and cultural power) and regulatory (given 
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the role they play in mediating the boundaries between art and not-art, art and 
geopolitics), the possibilities for critique and experimentation that these institutions and 
spaces offer can usefully be understood as metapolitical. 
 
Metapolitics of oil at Tate Galleries London 
Though its importance in the geopolitics of the modern world is readily apparent, oil also 
finds its way into art in multiple ways, as a material to be used, as a problem to be 
explored and, not least, as a source of finance by means of which art may be supported, 
traded or co-opted. The centrality of oil to the Iraq war and to debates about climate 
change and the Anthropocene and the manner in which it has been politicised and 
enrolled in recent art projects lend it further relevance as a lens through which to 
consider how metapolitics and geopolitics come together in galleries and museums. 
Recent works on the geopolitics of oil have focused particularly on its 
materialities and the technologies and practices through which they are constituted. As 
Tim Mitchell has argued, drawing on the work of Bruno Latour, an understanding of the 
geopolitics of oil must contend with the materiality of the networks through which it is 
extracted, transported, refined and consumed.39 It is to a significant extent through these 
networks and the forms of expertise, calculation and economy through which they are 
constituted and managed, that ‘energy security’ has emerged as a modern dispositif of 
government.  Drawing further on accounts of materiality, Andrew Barry has examined 
the role of scientific, activist and artistic practices in the constitution and contestation of 
oil as a geopolitical object.40 In particular, Barry discusses the experimental practices of 
the London-based art-activist group Platform, which has questioned the role of London 
in reproducing the geopolitics of oil. Here I consider practices and projects that bear a 
number of affinities and connections with Platform’s work, but focus specifically on how 
they activate the metapolitics of art. The question of metapolitics becomes particularly 
	 16 
evident in how galleries, understood as institutions, architectural spaces, archives and 
sites for diverse kinds of practices, are themselves utilised and activated in the realisation 
of art works and exhibitions. I therefore consider interventions that have focused on 
Tate Galleries in London in ways that reflexively involve and implicate the gallery in the 
execution of works and exhibitions. These are particularly illustrative of practices that 
borrow from art and geopolitics, while blurring distinctions between them, and which 
seek to align sensation and sense-making in particular ways. 
An essential context for these projects has been the prior framing of the Tate as 
an important node in what Platform has called the ‘carbon web’. As described by James 
Marriott and Mika Minio-Paluello, the carbon web is a ‘network of bodies’ that includes 
oil companies but also ‘public and private banks, government ministries and military 
bodies, engineering companies and legal firms, universities and environmental 
consultants, non-governmental organisations and cultural institutions’.41 If this web is 
taken to include all carbon-based energy forms, then it might in fact already encompass 
the Tate from its inception under the auspices of the sugar refiner Henry Tate in 1897. 
However, it is Tate’s sponsorship by BP (formerly the Anglo-Persian Oil Company) that 
has been a particular focus of scrutiny. In questioning this relationship, Platform have 
argued that cultural institutions have been used to normalise and legitimise the activities 
of a company that has been implicated in human rights abuses and environmental 
destruction, and which contributes massively to anthropogenic climate change. The 
projects I consider below take up the question of oil in these terms, mobilising the gallery 
as a space that is putatively apart from life and the world, while implicating them in each 
other in different and contrasting ways. They are therefore apposite in demonstrating 
how the metapolitics of art can be activated in different ways. 
 
The Robinson Institute  
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The Robinson Institute took place at Tate Britain at Millbank, on the north side of the River 
Thames, in 2012. In it, curator Patrick Keiller presented an exhibition ostensibly put 
together by researchers who had discovered the film archive of a fictional ‘itinerant 
scholar’ who had explored the landscape of South East England in a series of travels, 
tracing links between places, events and ‘ongoing economic and environmental crisis’.42 
In the exhibition, the concerns of The Institute were described as being ‘to promote 
political and economic change by developing the transformative potential of images of 
landscape’.43 The exhibition thus adopted a political goal from the outset but pursued it 
via artistic means. It was comprised of seven distinct displays, each made up of a diverse 
assembly of paintings, photographs, maps, charts, video screens and other objects, 
arranged around the Duveen Galleries. Each of these displays considered a particular 
theme or problem relating to historical, political, economic and (in the attribution of 
importance to meteorites and space dust) cosmic forces shaping the English landscape.  
Dispositifs of geopolitics appeared most prominently in display three, titled 
‘Greenham Common, Aldermaston, and the Government Pipeline and Storage System’. 
This assembled a diverse range of art works, maps and texts to present a political 
cartography of oil and security networks running through Britain and of events through 
which those networks have been contested and reconfigured, suggesting a number of 
connections and resonances between art history and geopolitical history. 
The text accompanying this part of the exhibition mentioned the Atomic 
Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston and describes how it has been integrated into 
the US-UK defence relationship and the Trident nuclear weapons system. It also 
discussed the nearby airbase at Greenham Common and the Greenham Common 
Women’s Peace Camp created there in 1981. It went on to mention that Aldermaston is 
one of the destinations of the Government Pipeline and Storage System (GPSS), an 
energy security network linking government and corporate pipelines to supply fuel to 
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British and American military bases and to civil airports. A map of the GPSS and a 
reading copy of James Bamberg’s book, The History of the British Petroleum Company: Volume 
2 The Anglo-Iranian Years 1928-1954, which describes the 1954 overthrow of the 
Mossadeq regime in a coup orchestrated by the UK and the US, were positioned 
alongside the display of art works from the Tate and other collections. The display thus 
brought together both art and non-art materials in the context of an exhibition that was 
itself an art work. 
The display was arrayed in three sections. The first section from the left was 
composed of two untitled, abstract landscapes of Iraq in red and black painted by the 
Scottish artist James Boswell in 1948, following his time serving there as part of the 
British occupation during the Second World War. This was located next to a striking, 
large format print of Andreas Gursky’s 2005 photographic work Bahrain I, a digitally 
manipulated image of the Bahrain International motor racing circuit in which segments 
of the black track stand out starkly against the desert setting. The next section contained 
Sydney Carline’s 1919 painting Over the Hills of Kurdistan: Flying Over Kirkuk, a watercolour 
that depicts RAF aeroplanes above the landscape of what came to be northern Iraq. It 
also displayed Number 23, an instantly-recognisable abstract expressionist work by 
Jackson Pollock from 1948 as well as the monochromatic works Building Ships: On the 
Stocks (a commissioned work of war art by Muirhead Bone, 1971) and Bomb Falling into 
Water (Leonard Rosoman, 1942). Also included were two anti-nuclear montages by Peter 
Kennard, Haywain with Cruise Missiles, 1980 and Defended to Death, 1983. Two films (Oil for 
the Twentieth Century, British Pathé 1951 and excerpts from Keiller’s own Robinson in Ruins, 
2010, including shots of elements of the GPSS) could be viewed on video screens. The 
third section displayed a Keiller digital photomontage showing a Ministry of Defence By-
law notice from Aldermaston, a Raissa Page photograph showing protestors dancing on 
missile silos at Greenham Common in 1983, and a 1982 Richard Hamilton sketch of 
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Hugh Gaitskell, the Labour Party leader who opposed unilateral disarmament during the 
early 1960s. 
This part of the exhibition thus presented a rich and suggestive array of artistic 
and other materials relating to the geopolitics of oil and nuclear weapons, their influence 
on the British landscape and how they have been taken up in politics, social history and 
art. Indeed, the display could be discussed at some length as offering a critical 
materialisation and representation of Britain’s geopolitical predicaments in the era of oil. 
However, what I want to emphasise are what I take to be the metapolitical dimensions of 
the display and the exhibition more generally, which stem from the ways in which they 
‘frame’ and ‘people’ the gallery. 
The broader project from which The Robinson Institute stems was conceived in 
part through ideas drawn from Martin Heidegger, Theodor Adorno, Karl Polanyi and 
Henri Lefebvre concerning the meaning of dwelling and home amidst capitalist 
transformation. Particularly important was the idea, elucidated through the figure of 
Robinson, that Lefebvre’s concept of representational space, ‘admits the possibility of 
change through efforts by, and works, of, the imagination’, including art.44 By walking, 
Robinson ‘sought to recover the possibility of political and economic transformation’, a 
project continued by the Institute’s researchers as they explored histories that remained 
‘unfinished’.45 
What is of particular interest here is how The Robinson Institute draws upon the 
‘primary aesthetics’ of the gallery. The exhibition assembled materials from museum 
archives together with other geopolitical texts to re-present landscape, place, history and 
politics, using the archive and the space of the museum to enact an alternative 
representation of Britain and its place in the world. It mobilised artistic materials and 
spaces – Tate archives and the Duveen Galleries – to question the wider networks within 
which they themselves were located and which made them possible. Yet while it implied 
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a critical analysis of contemporary crisis and of the role played in it by oil, and while open 
about its commitment to political transformation, it offered no programmatic or 
polemical statements. In this sense, it enacted the idea of the gallery as a space apart, a 
space for contemplation by a visitor. 
As Rancière has argued, 
In the museum, which is not merely a specific type of building, but a form of framing of 
common space and a mode of visibility, all … representations are disconnected from a 
specific destination, are offered to the same ‘indifferent gaze’. This is the reason that the 
museum today can accommodate not only all kinds of prosaic objects, but also forms of 
information and debate on public issues that challenge mainstream forms of information 
and discussion.46 
To the extent that it expressed a hope for political and economic transformation through 
engagement with striking images of landscape, the exhibition thus sought to engender 
effects ‘without using the terms of a message’. Further, while the analysis evident in the 
exhibition might have been taken to implicate the Tate as an institution, no mention of 
this was made in the exhibition itself. As an exhibition in an elite cultural institution 
located a short distance from Britain’s core government, military, intelligence, police and 
diplomatic institutions and funded by a major oil company, The Robinson Institute in no 
way sought to mobilise, compel or influence people in the manner wished for by some 
advocates of politicised art.47 
If art is metapolitical not because of its specific content but ‘because of the time 
and space it institutes, and the manner in which it frames this time and peoples this 
space’, then here this lay in the exhibition’s respecting of the space of the museum as 
being apart from geopolitics, a space of contemplation and reflection; of free appearance 
and the free play of the faculties. The exhibition necessarily left aside the possibility of 
any direct geopolitical function or effect and was staked upon the possibility, discussed 
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extensively by Rancière, that a visitor might be intrigued, enlightened and thereby 
activated. This is a classic rationality of critical or political art, but one that embraces 
rather than disrupts the gallery as a specific kind of time, space and experience. 
 
Liberate Tate 
My second example concerns a series of interventions that proceed from an analysis of 
the problem of oil that is similar to that evident in The Robinson Institute, but which engage 
art’s metapolitics by disrupting rather than embracing the functioning of gallery and 
museum space. It relates to works by Liberate Tate, a group that, beginning in 2010, 
conducted a series of unauthorised performances bringing bodies, oil and other materials 
into the spaces of Tate Britain and Tate Modern, located a little further down the 
Thames and on the opposite South Bank. Liberate Tate emerged in the context of a 
broad coalition of groups that had been campaigning on issues of environmental justice, 
corporate responsibility and foreign policy for nearly three decades. Central to this 
coalition was the group Platform, which had developed a sustained body of practice 
combining art, activism, research and education on social justice issues since its 
formation in 1983, turning to focus especially on the question of oil in 1995, in light of 
the controversy around Shell’s North Sea platform the Brent Spar and the execution of 
the Ogoni writer and activist Ken Saro-Wiwa by the Nigerian state.48 By 2010 the 
relationship between oil companies and British cultural institutions had already been 
problematised by a range of groups, but at that time oil company sponsorship continued 
to be offered and accepted. 
The specific move made by Liberate Tate was to conduct a series of 
interventions within Tate Britain and Tate Modern that were legible as the kinds of 
works that might be expected in a contemporary art space, but with crucial, 
performatively improper dimensions. These works have furthermore been documented 
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on a website that uses fonts and layout closely paralleling those of the Tate. Liberate Tate 
have thus to a significant extent worked through the appropriation of and 
overidentification with Tate, while also rendering it permeable to activist practices. These 
tactics are readily illustrated via a handful of brief vignettes.49 
In April 2011 the work Human Cost was performed in the Duveen gallery at Tate 
Britain. In this work, which took place on the first anniversary of the explosion of BP’s 
Deepwater Horizon platform in the Gulf of Mexico, a naked male artist curled up on the 
gallery floor and two figures, veiled and dressed in black, poured thick black oil over him 
out of green watering cans bearing the BP logo. The cans were then left alongside the 
artist, now mostly covered in the oil, which had also started to spread out in a thin pool 
across the gallery floor. The work evoked sculpture and the role of the nude in art history 
and carried a certain risk to the health of the performer. 
In video footage of this and other works, Tate staff appear either unwilling or 
unable to prevent these works taking place, but often quickly cordon them off and 
sometimes bring screens to shield them from general view. However, this does not 
prevent the works from attracting the attention and sometimes participation of gallery 
goers, nor their being videoed and photographed so that their reach can be extended 
through online dissemination. In another dramatic intervention, The Gift, 2012, the group 
‘installed’ a blade from a wind turbine in the turbine hall of Tate Modern. The blade, 
measuring 16.5 metres in length and weighing one and a half tonnes, echoed the 
building’s previous life as Bankside Power Station and signalled a possible transition 
away from carbon-based energy resources towards renewables. This work was cordoned 
off but video of the event also shows that, before workers arrived to dismantle and 
remove the object, it was encircled by people holding each others’ hands. In a further 
indication of how the museum itself was mobilised through the work, a member of the 
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Tate initiated a petition to have the object, which was presented to Tate as a gift under 
the Museums and Galleries Act 2002, accepted into the collection. 
The work Hidden Figures, which took place in the Turbine Hall at Tate Modern in 
2014, used a black square of cotton material measuring eight metres across. Visitors to 
the gallery were invited to take hold of the square and to move underneath it, 
‘manifesting a hidden figure’. This made explicit reference to Black Square, one of the 
most famous works by the early twentieth century Polish Russian suprematist Kasimir 
Malevich, which formed a centerpiece for a retrospective of the artist’s work then on 
show in the gallery. As the group stated, referencing the Tate’s refusal of a campaign 
demand to make public the extent of BP sponsorship: ‘Hidden Figures symbolises the 
black stain oil sponsorship makes on cultural institutions; the thick black redaction over 
the BP sum that Tate won’t reveal; the veil that Liberate Tate performers have worn; the 
figurative shapes these performers are making with their bodies.’ This was further linked 
with the argument that the Tate was a public space that should be equally accessible to all 
and not taken over by BP. In this way, Liberate Tate again located their intervention 
within art history and contemporary art practice as well as in relation to specific 
demands. 
Utilising gallery spaces and practices, Liberate Tate have employed ‘the forms of 
visibility and discursivity that make art identifiable as such’, intersecting the metapolitics 
of art and the dispositif of oil in highly specific ways. Their interventions lend new 
resonances to Rancière’s statement that debates on contemporary art ‘are all about 
matters of spatialization’, dealing with ‘the sense of the common that is at stake in those 
shifts between one spatial setting and another, or between presence and absence’.50 
Bringing oil, a turbine blade, a black square and other objects into the gallery, their 
practices activate the dispositif of oil metapolitically, as art. 
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However, while Liberate Tate ‘borrow connections that provoke political 
intelligibility’ while mobilising ‘the sense of sensory foreignness’ of historical and 
contemporary art practices, they also seek to link their interventions with conventional 
political tactics like petitions, communiqués and collective letters. In Rancière’s terms, 
the risk that such tactics run is of short-circuiting the properly metapolitical nature and 
effects of art and being recognised as just protest. The further risk of this is that they 
might lose their affective charge, allowing them to be more easily dismissed or ignored. 
However, while some media reporting has described Liberate Tate’s interventions as 
‘protest’, they have also been described as both performance art and protest.51 And while 
video and photographic records of the works emphasise the extent to which they have 
been reflexively staged as media events, some also appear to attract participation and 
enchantment among gallery-goers (some of whom may of course be ‘in’ on the work). 
This apparent entrainment of visitors to the gallery – and even gallery and security staff – 
as participants in individual works represents a further, distinct rationality of art, which 
aims to activate people not just as spectators but as more fully involved in the embodied 
realisation of works.52 These kinds of tactics, in which the lines between art and 
geopolitics are blurred and crossed through material and symbolic practices, have their 
own genealogies but are enabled in the first place by the prior existence of a space and 
time in which they might in the first place be recognised as art. 
 
Conclusion 
This article has aimed to develop a sharpened conceptual appreciation of how art 
engages geopolitics. Political geographers and others have so far developed a wide-
ranging and illuminating corpus of work on artistic interventions in dispositifs of 
geopolitical power. But while a substantial body of work has considered how artistic 
practices engage particular formations of geopolitical power, this work has rarely inquired 
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into what makes the practices that are of interest specifically artistic. Rather, their 
‘artness’ has been for the most part assumed. People, practices, works and events are 
commonly identified in terms of art, but the question of how this designation can be 
made at all and the implications of making it are often overlooked. 
To put it in a slightly different way, the ontology and epistemology of artistic 
enactments of geopolitics have been under-conceptualised and, as a result, important 
aspects of their nature, stakes and implications remain under-explored. In particular, 
while the potentialities of artistic engagements are often valorised and their limitations 
noted, there has been little discussion of the manner in which they might both stem from 
art’s very conditions of possibility as a distinct form of practice and experience. 
Furthermore, it can be argued that it is to a significant extent in the conditions of 
possibility for art itself – rather than its specific content – that its critical potential and 
implications may be said to lie. Conceptualising art as a dispositif that carries a particular 
kind of metapolitics addresses these issues and helps in thinking through the critical 
relevance and implications of art that engages geopolitics. 
In his essay The paradoxes of political art, Rancière writes that  
[w]ithin any given framework, artists are those whose strategies aim to change the frames, speeds 
and scales according to which we perceive the visible, and combine it with a specific invisible 
element and a specific meaning. Such strategies are intended to make the invisible visible or to 
question the self-evidence of the visible; to rupture given relations between things and meanings 
and, inversely, to invent novel relationships between things and meanings that were previously 
unrelated.53 
Such strategies are in evidence in The Robinson Institute and the interventions of Liberate 
Tate. But what needs to be emphasised is the ‘given framework’ of the aesthetic dispositif, 
which allows art to be a distinct sensorium that is permeable to geopolitical practices 
without being collapsed into them. Conversely, when geopolitics appears within the 
sensorium of art, distinct modes of performance, affect, experience and perception (here, 
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spectatorship and participation) are implied. In the literature on art and geopolitics to 
date, much has been written about performances, affects, experiences and perceptions, 
but relatively little attention has been paid to what it is that makes them art, or to the 
implications of this condition.  
While The Robinson Institute mobilised multiple representational devices within the 
parameters of a conventional exhibition, Liberate Tate’s interventions comprised 
performances that were legible as art but which also challenged the Tate’s ability to 
determine proper conduct within the gallery and the boundaries between art and 
geopolitics. If The Robinson Institute expressed the mobilisation of museum space through 
hybrid academic, artistic and curatorial practices, then the work of Liberate Tate reflects 
a move to develop artistic practices that seek to link metapolitics with practices in the 
sphere of politics proper. They represent distinct tactics, but both operate within and 
through a dispositif that allows art to exist as such and which entails certain consequences, 
which are revealed more fully by contrasting how different kinds of practices address and 
activate museum spaces. 
I do not argue that one set of tactics is superior or more effective, but emphasise 
their conditions of possibility. Further, genealogically attuned, investigation might look 
more closely into how the rationalities, tactics and effects of specific art practices and 
movements engaging geopolitics seek to mobilise, but are also conditioned by, particular 
configurations of the dispositif of art. This would provide a way of thinking through more 
thoroughly the intertwining of the potentialities and limitations of artistic engagements of 
geopolitics. 
More broadly, a consideration of art and geopolitics through the dispositif locates 
art as well as geopolitics in relation to governmentality. Intimately connected with 
matters of conduct and counter-conduct, of ethics and desire, art comes to play a 
significant role in modern technologies of power and practices of government, but also 
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in opening them to question. While art may appear as a means of enhancing the 
government of bodies, populations and milieux, it also holds out a promise of equality 
and the possibility that things could be otherwise, as well as offering a variety of means 
for pursuing these ends. If art is a dispositif of government, it is one whose metapolitics 
are ambiguous and open to appropriation.  
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